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Infrastructure remains the backbone of an economy. The
G20s Global Infrastructure Hub forecasts a need of more
than US $ 4 trillion for infrastructure funding in the world
by 2040 (Jessop, 2017). Yet, paradoxically, the poor
performance of infrastructure projects and their lack of
resilience and adaptability seem to have become the norm.
The reasons for such a record of poor performance on
infrastructure projects are numerous. Changes in scope that
occur during the construction of assets because of
complexity, uncertainty and mismanagement are some of
the usual culprits. These changes of scope, for example,
may not only result in an increase or decrease in capital
expenditure (CAPEX) (Love et al., 2017; Invernizzi et al.,
2018), but also inﬂuence the ability to provide added-value
during operations and maintenance. Increases or decreases
in CAPEX, adversely impact an asset owner’s ability to
provide effective and efﬁcient goods and services as well
as taxpayers, contractors and their supply chains’ proﬁt-
ability. As a result, this hinders an asset owners’ ability to
secure infrastructure that is both resilient to unexpected
events and adaptable to changing needs, uses or capacities
(Love et al., 2017).
There have been countless reports and studies under-
taken to espouse the need to ‘future proof’ the delivery and
cost-effectiveness of infrastructure assets. For example, the
United Nations has set the making of cities and human
settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable as one
of its Sustainable Development Goals for developing
countries. Future-prooﬁng is the critical process of
anticipating future events, changes, needs or uses to
prepare appropriately, minimize impact and capitalise on
opportunities (Masood et al., 2015). While such work has
been used to support the establishment of much needed
public policy and provide direction to acquire the beneﬁts
of enacting a ‘future-prooﬁng’ strategy, a fundamental
question remains unanswered once the decision-to-build
has been made: ‘How can asset owners deliver their new
infrastructure assets cost-effectively and ensure they are
robust, resilient and adaptable? ’ This question is the focus
of this commentary.
Prevailing evidence indicates that current strategies,
processes, methods and technologies used to deliver,
maintain and operate infrastructure assets in Australia are
not able to guarantee cost-effective ‘future-proofed’ assets.
With calls for a commensurate need to shift toward the
digitisation of built environment’s practice being made, an
urgency to re-examine the actual activity, events, and the
nature of work and its context is needed so that the issue of
‘how’ to leverage effective new tools, techniques, and
frameworks can be undertaken. Put simply, infrastructure
assets are still being delivered and managed under the
auspices of a 20th Century paradigm and an urgent shift is
required to operate in the ‘digital era’ to accommodate the
changing nature of work, demographic patterns, markets,
sustainability and climate change. Thus, there is a need for
more symbiosis between the digital and the physical
backbones of infrastructure.
By some estimates, the cost of non-resilience in
Australia is too high: The economic cost of unmitigated
climate change represents 0.5% of GDP by 2020, rising to
1.2% in 2050 (Garnuat, 2011). A signiﬁcant proportion of
Australian infrastructure assets are privately owned or
operated on a commercial basis by the private sector. Thus,
Received May 25, 2018
Peter E.D. LOVE (✉)
School of Civil and Mechanical Engineering, Curtin University, Perth,
Western Australia 6845, Australia
E-mail: p.love@curtin.edu.au
Lavagnon A. IKA
Telfer School of Management, University of Ottawa, 55 Laurier Avenue
East, Ottawa, Ontario KIN 6N5, Canada
Giorgio LOCATELLI
School of Civil Engineering, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT,
Yorkshire, United Kingdom
Dominic D. AHIAGA-DAGBUI
School of Architecture and Built Environment, Deakin University,
Geelong, Victoria 3220, Australia
Front. Eng. Manag. 2018, 5(3): 407–410
https://doi.org/10.15302/J-FEM-2018204
in supporting national security, economic prosperity and
community well-being, it is imperative that the public and
private sector infrastructure providers work collaboratively
and cooperatively to ensure that the ‘Next Generation’ of
infrastructure is deisgn and constructed in a timely manner
and at minimum expense. In addition, a project’s life cycle,
and its ability to be of value into the future for human-kind
needs to be considered. Underpinning the next wave of
infrastructure investment is the availability of the ﬁnance
to fund projects; thus, ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial incen-
tives and risk sharing will need to be re-examined,
particularly project delivery methods as they will need to
support newly digitised processes. There is need to
engender and enact changes to existing policies and
practice toward infrastructure development in Australia in
order to become competitive in world markets.
The ‘Next Generation’ of infrastructure assets will be
subjected to increasing degrees of complexity, extreme
competition and uncertainty with respect to the outcomes
of climate change, availability of resources and the
emerging disruptive nature of digitisation. Regardless of
their origin, these factors indirectly stimulate an unprece-
dented rate of change, which asset owners and built-
environment professionals need to be prepared to embrace.
An inability to engage and embrace such change will
further inhibit their ability to deliver infrastructure assets
on budget, to schedule, to their speciﬁed quality and safety.
Despite public policy identifying ‘what’ needs to be
undertaken to ensure infrastructure resilience, a disconnect
exists between ‘what’ and ‘how’ assets can be ‘future-
proofed.’ Fundamentally, there has been a paucity of
research that has examined how processes should be re-
engineered to accommodate ‘future-prooﬁng’ as part of an
assets life-cycle performance improvement. Yet the
research that has been undertaken has tended to develop
new policies and frameworks that have been simply
superimposed on top of existing processes that are unable
to cope with the complexities and nuances needed to
provide resilient and adaptive assets. The upshot in this
instance is that there is an increasingly likelihood for
infrastructure assets to be delivered unsuccessfully, as cost
and schedule growth are experienced which may also lead
to safety and environmental issues occurring (Love et al.,
2016), not to speak of beneﬁt shortfalls.
The performance and productivity of infrastructure asset
delivery is a vexing problem for asset owners in Australia,
as it has been observed that, on average, 48% of them fail
to meet their baseline time, cost and quality objectives
(Carvel Group, 2013). Well-known Australian projects that
have attracted the attention of the popular press due to cost
overruns include the Melbourne’s Southern Cross Railway
Station, Sydney Cross City Tunnel, Brisbane’s RiverCity
Motorway and the M7 Clem Jones Tunnel.
Australia is becoming uncompetitive in the design and
delivery of its infrastructure projects; its hospitals are 62%
and its schools 26% more expensive to build than in other
countries that form part of the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Bowditch, 2013;
Davies, 2014). In Sydney, the cost of the 33 km-long
WestConnex Motorway, which includes a 13-km tunnel
has come under the spotlight, as it has been estimated that
it will cost a staggering $350 million per kilometre. Yet in
Paris, the ‘Duplex A86’, which is a 10-km road tunnel, cost
a mere $226 million per kilometre to construct. A plethora
of reasons have been put forward explaining ‘why’
Australia is more expensive than other OECD countries
in its delivery of infrastructure projects, which include
(Regan et al., 2015):
 prescriptive tendering processes, which require
ﬁnancing to be secured prior to the submission of bids
for construction;
 multifarious subcontracting that creates unnecessary
layers of management;
 over-speciﬁcation, or redundant performance, which
inhibits a contractor’s ability to provide innovative
alternatives;
 ineffective scoping of projects (scope creep) and low
adoption of digital engineering, which can contribute to an
excessive number of ‘changes orders’ being experienced
during construction; and
 an unjustiﬁed increase in salary levels in jobs that have
not experienced an increase in productivity, in response to
rising salaries in related professions that have undergone
growth in labor productivity. This scenario has been the
subject of intense debate, as the construction industry is
deemed to be a laggard when compared to other industrial
sectors of the economy.
The aforementioned issues are the ‘tip of the iceberg,’ as
the Australian construction industry’s ailments are deeply
embedded in a change-averse culture, with established
power structures and relationships that impede learning
and innovation being adopted. Despite intense periods of
introspection and several ‘Royal Commissions into the
Building Industry’, which have called for reforms to be
undertaken (Gyles, 1992; Cole, 2002), performance and
productivity improvements have been, at the best, marginal
and generally conﬁned to Occupational Health and Safety
improvements. The emergence of the digital era and the
call to adopt Building Information Modeling (BIM) and
smart technologies are disruptive enablers to improve the
performance of an asset over its life-cycle. However, the
absence of integrated structures and technology receptive
processes and an inability to respond to the change
required to effectively implement them has hindered their
potential to deliver the performance improvements that
have been widely espoused. If the ‘Next Generation’ of
infrastructure assets are to be ‘future-proofed,’ then
powerful transformational change is needed in the
processes of delivery and management.
Such change was recommended by Egan (1998) in the
UK almost 20 years ago and stipulated that the construc-
tion industry needed to adopt lean production techniques
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and set a number of targets for cutting costs, improving
predictability and eradicating defects. The absence of
incentives, collaborative working practices, and public
clients focusing on lowest price rather than value for
money has failed to make the change required to
revolutionize the UK construction industry (McMeekan,
2008). In attempting to address their performance woes, an
array of Australian companies have mimicked their UK
counterparts and implemented lean techniques and its
variants. Pockets of excellence can be found in Australia,
but on the whole lean techniques have not been widely
embraced or been signiﬁcantly successful (Heaton, 2015).
While the lean philosophy has merits, it has been applied in
a piecemeal manner by organisations without under-
standing the underlying dynamics that have contributed
to causing the problem they seek to address. Its adoption
simply adds another unproductive layer to the problems
that the construction industry has to deal with (Green,
2011).
The absence of a theory, for example, that explains
‘Why’ and ‘How’ infrastructure projects experience cost
overruns has contributed to thwarting the construction
industry’s adeptness to change (Love et al., 2016). There
has been an overreliance in explaining the cause of cost
overruns as ‘independent’ rather than ‘interdependent’
causal inﬂuences and as such the views of those
participants involved in the chain of events that lead to
their occurrence are generally limited to speciﬁc issues at
certain points in time. Thus, the determination of causation
is narrowly and superﬁcially deﬁned, which potentially
leads to innate bias being reported. Furthermore, there has
been a tendency to pinpoint a single ‘root cause’ for a cost
overrun and then suggest that an intervention will change
and/or prevent its occurrence. However ‘the root cause’
often represents the place at a point in time where a
researcher decided to complete their investigation. The use
of singular, independent-cause identiﬁcation approaches
has led to inappropriate risk assessments being developed
throughout the delivery process; the interdependency
between causal variables has still not been effectively
considered.
Cost overruns seldom occur as a result of a stand-alone
cause (Love et al., 2016). Even though they may super-
ﬁcially appear to be different, the causes of poor
performance in infrastructure projects are interwoven and
form a complex network. The same goes for over-
simpliﬁcation of complexity in the identiﬁcation of the
causes of cost overruns. There is, therefore, a need to move
beyond simply developing lists or ranks of independent
factors to understand dynamic connections between
various causal factors and how they materialise during
the course of a project’s life. Failure to adequately
understand and accommodate this inherent interdepen-
dency can lead to the development of sub-optimal
solutions for ‘future prooﬁng’. Ultimately, the cost to
construct an infrastructure asset inﬂuences the extent of
‘future prooﬁng’ that can be undertaken. Thus, there is a
need to challenge contemporary thinking that surrounds
cost overrun causation by ensuring explanations are
grounded in situated practice so emergent theory reﬂects
reality. Instead of reducing complexity, let us embrace
complexity for more infrastructure resilience and adapt-
ability!
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